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This paper develops a human capital measure in the sense of Schultz (1960) and then reevaluates the
contribution of human capital to China’s economic growth. The results indicate that human capital
plays a much more important role in China’s economic growth than available literature suggests, 38.1%
of economic growth over 1978-2008, and even higher for 1999-2008. In addition, because human
capital formation accelerated following the major educational expansion increases after 1999 (college
enrollment in China increased nearly fivefold between 1997 and 2007) while growth rates of GDP
are little changed over the period after 1999, total factor productivity increases fall if human capital
is used in growth accounting as we suggest. TFP, by our calculations, contributes 16.92% of growth
between 1978 and 2008, but this contribution is -7.03% between 1999 and 2008. Negative TFP growth
along with the high contribution of physical and human capital to economic growth seem to suggest
that there have been decreased in the efficiency of inputs usage in China or worsened misallocation
of physical and human capital in recent years. These results underscore the importance of efficient




University of Western Ontario









1.   Introduction 
We reevaluate the role of human capital in economic growth in China relative to recent 
growth accounting literature (Chow and Li, 2002; Wang and Yao, 2003; Bosworth and Collins, 
2008) which seemingly concludes that human capital has been relatively unimportant for China’s 
growth. China maintained high growth rate for more than three decades after the 1978 reforms. 
The average real GDP growth rate was 9.82% between 1978 and 2008. But since 1999 there has 
been a major transformation in higher education in China as documented by Li et al. (2008). 
Existing growth accounting literature concludes that despite this physical capital growth rather 
than growth of human capital which is central to China’s growth.  
Following Barro and Lee (1993) which uses changes in the years of schooling over time 
as a proxy for human capital growth human capital is the relatively slow growing input in growth 
accounting for China and contributes little to growth. We use an alternative measure of human 
capital constructed from the opportunity cost side and reevaluate the contribution of human 
capital to China’s growth. We treat human capital in its original Schultz (1960) sense as the 
opportunity cost foregone when individuals acquire human capital. This focuses on the earnings 
foregone when obtaining schooling, and the time and cost involved. We modify the procedure 
used by Barro and Lee (1993, 2000) and use the flow of graduates from different levels of 
education as the estimate of the volume increase in human capital, and then use the real average 
wage over time to value the time input into human capital formation for different levels of 
education. Under this treatment the human capital stock for the whole of China is much faster 
growing than in previous literature because wages change significantly over time.  
Using this measure of the human capital stock, we recalculate the role of physical capital 
accumulation in China’s economic growth along with labor, and human capital stock. Our results 3 
 
suggest that human capital is much more important for China’s growth than in existing growth 
accounting literature. During the period 1978-2008, our calculations suggest that China’s human 
capital stock increased by 7.6% annually, and contributed 33.2% to growth, even though 
physical capital still contributes to economic growth in a major way (45.1%, between 1978 and 
2008). Human capital’s contribution is almost the same in recent decades at nearly 40%. The 
contribution of physical capital in the last decade accounts for more than 68% of economic 
growth, but equally human capital is important for China’s economic growth, reflecting the 
transformation in higher education since 1999 (See Li et al., 2008). Our growth accounting 
results suggest that China’s growth reflects input growth, physical capital as well as human 
capital, rather than exogenous technical changes as in Solow’s (1957) original growth accounting 
study of the U.S.. In China’s case, in the most recent decade, TFP growth becomes negative in 
the calculations we report. 
There are several implications which follow from our analysis. As the contribution of 
TFP to growth in growth accounting is calculated as a residual, when we both separately identify 
and appropriately measure human capital accumulation, TFP growth in China is small to 
negative. This implies China’s economic growth is mainly driven by capital accumulation, of 
both physical and human capital. But negative TFP growth suggests that there may well be 
inefficient use of human capital in recent decades, and this is particularly manifest in increased 
unemployment of college graduates. This misallocation of human capital and physical capital 
means that the Chinese economy may operate significantly inside the production frontier despite 
achieving high rates of growth. These findings suggest that there are substantial returns to raising 
employment of those with higher education and deploying human capital more efficiently. The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a brief review of previous growth accounting literature 4 
 
on China and the role that human capital formation plays in it, and sets out the basic growth 
accounting framework. Section 3 discusses how human capital can best be incorporated into a 
growth accounting framework, and highlights critical issues in the measurement of human 
capital in the Chinese case given China’s high growth rate.  Section 4 provides a series of growth 
decompositions using growth accounting methods for China which stress the revision we offer to 
existing analysis of the role of human capital in China’s growth. A final section, concludes. 
  5 
 
2.  Earlier Analyses of Sources of Chinese Growth 
Positions on the sources of growth in China today are critical in framing an overall policy 
stance towards maintaining high growth in the future. The 11
th five year plan in 2005, for 
instance, reported growth accounting calculations in which total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth accounted for around 40% of growth and argued for a target to raise this to 60% of 
growth (Fan, 2006). This in turn was to be achieved by large increases in educational 
expenditures with a stress on a knowledge based economy with both upgrading of quality of 
products and development of new products. This view of the Chinese growth process finds its 
echo in the sharp rise in information technology product exports from around 7% in the early 
1990s to around 30% today (Xing, 2010). 
The view that TFP growth increases are the way to sustain high Chinese growth is, 
however, one which can be challenged following debate over the main sources of growth in 
China over the last two decades. The view in the 1990s was that China’s growth was driven 
primarily by growth of total factor productivity (TFP) as in Solow’s (1957) analysis of US long 
term growth. Later empirical analysis for China by Maddison (1999) and the World Bank (1997) 
showed, however, that TFP growth accounted for over 30-58% of China’s growth during 1978-
1995. Hu and Khan (1997) calculated an average Chinese TFP growth of 3.9% over this period 
which they claimed accounted for more than 40% of China’s growth in the early reform years. 
However, other economists have argued that China’s growth in this period was mainly driven by 
the growth of inputs rather than TFP growth. Chow and Li (2002) found that the main 
contribution to China’s economic growth in the post reform period of 1978-1998 was from 
capital accumulation rather than TFP increases in productivity. In their analysis capital 
accumulation accounted for 54% of growth while TFP increases accounted for only 32% of 6 
 
growth, and labor input growth 13%. Li et al. (2005) reported an even higher contribution of 
capital accumulation to growth of 63.2% in the post reform period 1978-2003. The contribution 
of labor input growth was only 10.6%, total factor productivity contributed the 26.2% residual. 
At the same time related work raised doubts concerning China’s growth rate reflecting 
what was seen as poor quality of Chinese data. Krugman (1994), for instance, argued it is 
difficult to account for China’s growth because of poor quality of data in China. Young (2003) 
also questioned the quality of Chinese data and after making adjustments to public Chinese data, 
found nonagricultural labor productivity growth of 2.6% and TFP growth of 1.4 per year. Holz 
(2006) further explored Chinese data issues. 
Another strand of literature examines the role of human capital in understanding China’s 
high growth, also our focus here. At analytical level, Lucas (1988) stressed human capital as an 
engine for economic growth and Romer (1990) developed a model in which growth was driven 
by human capital accumulation, with no special analysis of the Chinese case. However, later 
empirical analysis by Wang and Yao (2003) decomposes China’s growth sources into physical 
and human capital accumulation, as well as labor force growth. For the post reform period 1978-
1999, the contribution of physical capital accumulation, labor, and human capital accumulation 
are 47.7%, 15.9%, 11%, respectively with total factor productivity growth in the post reform 
period contribution is 25.4% of China’s growth.  Their results suggest that the human capital 
contributes in a major way to Chinese economic growth before reform, when TFP growth is 
negative, but after reform, the contribution of human capital is minor. The results seem 
counterintuitive since formal human capital formation increases sharply after the reforms. For 
example, according to their data, average years of schooling in China increase from 3.6 in 1978 
to 5.9 in 1999. 7 
 
A more recent paper, Bosworth and Collins (2008) also analyses sources of China’s 
growth over the period 1978-2004. They decompose the growth of per capita output into growth 
of capital and education per worker. Their result shows that 3.2% of the 7.3% per capita output 
growth over this period is contributed by physical capital growth per worker, i.e., 44% of per 
capita output growth is due to physical capital accumulation. Only 0.3% of the 7.3% output per 
capita growth is from education, that is to say, 4.1% of growth is contributed by education. The 
residual 3.6% or 49% of growth is from total factor productivity growth. 
The literature view thus seems to be that human capital formation is of little consequence 
in understanding China’s high growth since reform in 1978. This is despite large increases in 
educational spending and participation since 1999.   8 
 
3.  Growth Accounting and Human Capital 
Most growth accounting work builds on Solow’s (1957) paper. He showed how to use an 
aggregate production function to decompose overall growth rates into growth of Hicks-neutral 
disembodied technical change and a weighted sum of rates of growth of factor inputs, coming to 
the conclusion that for the U.S. using data back to the 1870’s the majority of U.S. growth arose 
from disembodied technical change. Later work challenged this conclusion using embodied 
technical change and quality adjustments over time for inputs. 
This framework is well known using a CRS production function with capital and labor as 
inputs, and assuming factors are paid their values marginal products, 
    , tt t t YA F K N  ,                                                                   (1) 
where Yt is output, Kt is capital. Nt is the work force, At is the Hicksian Neutral technology factor, 
then after a simple transformation of a time derivative, one can obtain the well known Solow 
growth accounting equation: 
  , Y A KK NN ggs g s g                                                                 (2) 
where  x g xx   is the growth rate of x, where x refers to Y, A, K, and N
 alternately. sK and sN are 
shares of capital and labor in national income. 
In principle it is easy to extend Solow’s formulation to include human capital as well as 
the work force in the aggregate production function and extend it to a three-factor formulation. 
Human capital is then the increment which improves unimproved (or uneducated) labor through 
the educational process. 
Early growth accounting literature, including Solow (1957) and Denison (1962), 
decomposed the overall growth rate into contributions from capital and labor service growth, and 9 
 
computed the so-called Solow residual to capture the rate of technological change. Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967) later noted that changes in the quality of factor inputs and particularly labor can 
play a major role in the decomposition of growth performance, and sharply reduce the 
contribution of Hicksian neutral technical change to growth. They did not explicitly refer to or 
emphasize human capital as well, but discussed education as something which improves labor 
quality over time. Increases in educational participation were therefore important in raising labor 
quality and raising growth rates. In this paper, we highlight that how human capital is measured 
in growth accounting is also important. 
 
3.1  Barro and Lee’s (1993; 2000) Approach to Measuring Human Capital 
In recent literature and following Barro and Lee (1993, 2000), school enrollment rates, or 
adult literacy rates are frequently used as proxies for human capital because of the inadequacy of 
measures for human capital, Barro and Lee (1993; 2000) also used a perpetual inventory 
approach in estimating their human capital proxies. In constructing a measure of human capital 
for use in growth accounting, Barro and Lee (1993) use information which comes from census 
and survey estimates of educational attainment from UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks, U.N. 
Demographic Yearbooks, and other sources to first construct a data set on educational attainment 
for 129 countries over five-year periods from 1960 to 1985. They then use a perpetual inventory 
method to construct a human capital measure for each country that starts with census/survey 
figures as benchmark stocks and then uses school enrollment ratios to estimate changes from the 
benchmarks to get an estimate of education attainment for missing values. Barro and Lee (1996; 
2000) update their data to 1990 and 1995 to provide a data set for international comparison and 
growth analysis.  10 
 
Since we build on their method, we will first briefly review Barro and Lee’s (1993; 2000) 
method. They consider country populations aged 25 and over in their 1993 paper, and later 
extended it to consider the population aged 15 and over in their 2000 paper. If Lt is the 
population aged 25 and over at time t, and Hjt is the number of people within this adult 
population for whom j is the highest level of education attainment, and j=0 for no schooling, j=1 
for completed primary, j=2 for completed secondary, and j=3 for completed higher education, 
then hjt=Hjt/Lt is the proportion of the adult population for whom j is the highest educational 
level attained. PRIt-τ is the gross enrollment ratio for primary school, SECt- τ the ratio for 
secondary school, and HIGHt- τ the ratio for higher education, all observed at time t- τ. L25t is the 
population aged 25-29 at time t who entered into Lt during the previous five years. Barro and Lee 
assume that these new entrants would have received primary education 15 years earlier (if they 
attend primary school), secondary education 10 years earlier (if they attended secondary school), 
and higher education 5 years earlier (if they received higher education). 
Taking the no-schooling category as an example, the estimated number of people aged 25 
and over who have no educational attainment at time t is given by  
     0, 0, 5 15 12 5 1 tt t t t HH L P R I        ,                                                     (3) 
where δt is the proportion of people aged 25 and over in year t-5 who did not survive to year t. 
This is estimated as δt ≈ (L25t + Lt-5 – Lt)/Lt-5. They assume that the fraction of the population 
aged 25 to 29 who have no elementary education equals the fraction, 1-PRIt-15, who were not 
enrolled in primary school 15 years before. Substituting δt into (3), gives the fraction of the 
population with no schooling, 
      00 0 , 5 1 5 12 5 2 5 1 tt t t t t t t t h H L L L h L L PRI           ,                                   (4) 11 
 
The procedures they use for other levels of educational attainment are analogous. The 
resulting formulas are 
     11 1 , 5 1 5 1 0 12 5 2 5 tt t t t t t t t t hH L L Lh L LP R I S E C            ,                         (5) 
      22 2 , 5 1 0 5 12 5 2 5 tt t t t t t t t t hH L L Lh L LS E C H I G H            ,                     (6) 
    33 3 , 5 5 12 5 2 5 tt t t t t t t t h H L L L h L L HIGH           .                                        (7) 
Using these ratios, they get an estimate of average years of schooling for different countries 
for every year. 
 
3.2  Gemmell’s (1996) Adjustment of Barro and Lee 
Later, Gemmell (1996) made a significant adjustment to Barro and Lee’s procedure. The 
Barro and Lee’s (1993; 2000) method allows stock/accumulation effects to be investigated, but 
their dataset also includes adults not in the labor. Gemmell argues that only human capital in the 
labor force contributes to economic growth so that Barro and Lee’s method exaggerates the size 
of the human capital stock. He constructed a stock-flow measure of human capital in the labor 
force,  
  1 tt t t t t HH N R                                                                   (8) 
where Ht is the stock of human capital at time t, αt is the proportion of new labor force entrants, 
and Nt, and βt is the proportion of retirees with embodied human capital skills, Rt. He used 1960 
schooling enrollment ratios as a proxy for the proportion of the 1960 labor force with relevant 
levels of education, combining it with the working age population in 1960 to estimate the initial 12 
 
stock of human capital for different levels of education, and then used eq. (8) to estimate human 
capital stock over time. 
 
3.3  Opportunity Time Cost Based Human Capital Measures 
For growth accounting analyses of China, the Barro and Lee procedure produces a 
measure of human capital which is only slowly growing since increases in wage rates over time 
reflecting the opportunity cost of time involved in educational participation do not enter, as 
would be suggested by a Schultz (1960) formulation of human capital. We therefore combine the 
methods of Barro and Lee (1993; 2000) and Gemmell (1996), also using a perpetual inventory 
approach to estimate human capital stock in labor force. But we also treat human capital in its 
original Schultz (1960) senses as the opportunity cost foregone when individuals acquire human 
capital. Thus if a person with higher education spends sixteen years of formal education to 
accumulate his human capital, the total cost of time spent plus fees for the sixteen years would be 
the value of his human capital. Human capital would thus include foregone earnings over these 
sixteen years, including the direct cost of education, such as tuition and fees. If we assume wt are 
counterfactual earnings in year t during education, total forgone earnings for these sixteen years 
are hi=∑twt, t∈[t0,t1], t1-t0=16. For all people who finish higher education in a year, the 
additional human capital for the level of higher education would be the aggregate foregone 




Fh w    , where hi
l denotes human capital in 
that year for individual i in category l. F
l
t is the incremental or flow of human capital for category 
l in that year.  Using a perpetual inventory method applied to these measures gives 
   1 1
ll l
tt t t H HF     ,                                                                    (9) 13 
 
where Ht
l denotes the human capital stock in year t for category l, and δt is the depreciation rate 
for human capital in year t. The aggregate level of human capital would be the human capital 
stock for the economy, i.e., Ht  = ∑lHt
l. 
Instead of using enrollments as the flow measure of human capital formation, we use 
graduates as the flow of human capital as in Wang and Yao (2003). In China, there are usually 
six years for primary school education, three years for junior secondary school education, three 
years for senior secondary school education, and three or four years for tertiary education. 
Special secondary here mainly refers to vocational or technical schools, which are usually two or 
more years of education after junior secondary education. Tertiary graduates usually have 16 
years of education, special secondary graduates, 11 years, senior secondary school graduates, 12 
years, junior secondary graduates, 9 years, and primary school graduates, 6 years.  
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where Hjt stands for human capital stock for j level of education attained in year t, 1 for primary, 
2 for junior secondary, 3 for senior secondary, 4 for specialized secondary, and 5 for tertiary 
education. δt denotes the depreciation rate for human capital, which is proxyed by mortality rates 
for the population in t. PRIt, JUNIORt, SENIORt, SPECIALt, HIGHt denote the number of new 14 
 
graduates for primary, junior secondary, senior secondary, special secondary, and higher 
education. wt are real average wages in year t. 
Ideally, we should use average wage data for different levels of education in constructing 
our human capital estimate. These kinds of wage data are not available and so we use the same 
average wage for employees in China for all educational time valuations. The major impact of 
the adjustments we make in our human capital estimation is to capture changes in wages over 
time in the valuation of human capital inputs, and this effect is still preserved by this use of data.  
  15 
 
 4.  Measurement and Chinese Growth Accounting 
This section discusses the measurement of the variables used for our growth accounting. 
The variables involved are output, the physical capital stock, labor, and the human capital stock.  
 
4.1 Output 
Our output data, GDP, covers 31-year period (1978-2008), and are taken from the China 
Statistical Yearbook (hereafter CSY, 2009). We use the CSY constant price index to transform 
nominal output into real output. Fig 1 shows that real GDP growth rates were more than 8% in 
most years, only except in 1981, 1989 and 1990. We divide our data into two sub periods before 
and after 1999 to capture the impact of major educational reforms in China which sharply raised 
both tertiary educational expenditures and student enrollments (see Li et al. 2008). The average 
growth rate during the period 1978-2008 was 9.82%. The average growth rates during the sub 
periods 1978-1999 and 1999-2008 were 9.7% and 10.1%, respectively. It can be seen that the 
growth rates from 1999 continue at high levels until the Financial Crisis 2008, when they drop 
back to 9.6%. 



































































































































4.2 Physical  Capital  Stock 
We use a perpetual inventory approach to estimate the physical capital stock over the 
same period. We take the 1978 capital stock estimate from Chow (1993) and Chow and Li (2002) 
of 1 411.2 billion yuan as our initial physical capital stock estimate at the end of 1978. CSY 
(2009) provides a fixed capital price index (1991=100) after 1991. Hsueh and Li (1999) provide 
an implicit investment deflator for the period 1952-1995, based on data from the Annual Report 
of Statistics on Investment in Fixed Assets.  We combine Hsueh and Li (1999) and CSY (2009) 
together to get investment deflator from 1978-2008 and use gross fixed capital formation at 
current prices from CSY (2009), and the investment deflator above to estimate real investment.  
Our capital stock series is calculated as, 
  1 1 tt t K KI    ,                                                               (11) 
where δ is the depreciation rate.  
 


























































































Chow (1993) assumes that the depreciation rate is 4%, while Perkins (1988), Wang and Yao 
(2003) assume the depreciation rate is 5%, Chow and Li (2002) first assume the depreciation rate 
is 4% in 1978-1992, then use equation (3) to estimate the implied depreciation rates for 1993-
1998, giving an average implied depreciation rate of 5.4% which they then take 5.4% as the 
depreciation rate for the period of 1978-1998.  We assume an average depreciation rate of 5% 
between 1978 and 2008. Figure 2 reports our estimate of real capital stock and its growth rate. 
The accumulation of physical capital increases at high rates with three growth rate declines in 
1988, 1998, 2008, reflecting a downturn of economic activity in China in these years. The long-
term trend growth rate for the capital stock growth rate is around 13% annually in recent years.  
 
4.3 Labor 
CSY provides employment data from 1952-2008. There was a revision after 1990 
according to the 1990 population census data, and another revision according to 2000 population 
census data in 2002. Holz (2006) explores this issue in detail and adjusts the labor data before 
1990, so that the labor data is consistent before and after 1990. We use his adjusted employment 





4.4.  Human Capital  
In our growth accounting analysis, our measure of human capital follows Barro and Lee’s 
(1993; 2000) method to estimate average years of schooling as a proxy for human capital stock, 
but we  estimate the human capital stock using the Schultz (1960) motivated modification set out 
earlier. Figure 3 reports average years of schooling (following Barro and Lee), rising from 3.18 
years in 1978 to 6.33 years in 2008, an increase of 2.3% annually. However, our measure of the 
human capital stock suggests a much more rapid increase. The human capital stock was 1095 
billion yuan in 1978, and reached 9826 billion yuan in 2008, increasing by 7.6% annually. The 
increase of human capital from tertiary education is even larger, from 27 billion yuan in 1978 to 
1712 billion yuan in 2008, an increase of 14.8% annually. There is an increased rate of human 
capital formation for tertiary education after 2002 which is consistent with China’s higher 
education expansion after 1999 (see Li et al., 2008). Using average years of schooling as in 
 



























Barro and Lee significantly understates the changes in China’s human capital stock and 
downplays its role in China’s growth. 
To implement our growth accounting, we also need the share of physical capital in national 
income, sK. Usually, in growth accounting literature, sK is assumed to be a specific number. For 
example, Chow (1993) uses 0.6 as the share of capital over 1952-1980. Young (2003) and 
Bosworth and Collins (2008) use 0.4 as the share of capital. Wang and Yao (2003) assume 0.5 
for the share of capital over 1978-1999. Chow and Li (2002) estimate a Cobb-Douglas 
production function using data over 1952-1998, and this yields a coefficient for capital between 
0.61 and 0.63. Qian (2008), however, studied data on the share of capital in GDP in China and 
shows that the capital share in GDP to be continuously increasing after 1995. Before 1995, the 
capital share was less than 0.5 in most years, but after 1995, the share of capital increased rapidly, 
and reached 0.6 in 2007 (see Figure 4).  
 









































































Table 1 reports the average capital and labor share in GDP for different sub periods. The 
average share of capital for the whole period 1978-2008 is 0.5064. Before 1999, the share of 
capital is 0.4835, and after 1999, the average share of capital is 0.5623. 
 
Table 1 
Average share of capital and labor in GDP
1 
  share of capital  share of labor 
1978-2008  0.5064 0.4936 
1978-1999  0.4835 0.5165 
1999-2008  0.5623 0.4377 
1 The Chinese Statistical Yearbook does not provide aggregate labor share data, but divides regional GDP into 
compensation of employees, net taxes on production, depreciation of fixed assets and operating surplus. We 
aggregate this regional data to get Chinese GDP and the share of aggregate labor is calculated as the ratio of 
compensation of employees to GDP. 21 
 
5.  New Growth Accounting Analysis of Human Capital’s Role in China’s Economic 
Growth 
This section reports our growth accounting analyses of China’s economic growth using 
the modified human capital measures we set out above. We first evaluate the sources of growth 
in the original sense of Solow (1957), which only considers the role of physical capital and labor. 
Then we contrast results using Barro and Lee’s (1993; 2000) human capital measure in 
evaluating the role of human capital in growth and then our modified human capital measures in 
the sense of Schultz (1960). 
 
5.1  Sources of Growth in the Sense of Solow (1957) and Excluding Human Capital 
As in Solow (1957), we first decompose the sources of China’s economic growth into 
growth of capital and labor and TFP. Table 2 reports the results. During the period 1978-2008, 
the average GDP growth rate is 9.82%, the growth rate of capital is 8.72%, labor increases by 
1.67% annually, and TFP growth is 4.57% annually.  Thus, in this analysis capital contributes 
nearly 45%, and labor only contributes 8.5% of growth, the rest, 46.5%, is contributed by TFP. If 
TFP is interpreted as technological change, then China’s economic growth is mainly driven by 
capital input growth and technological improvement. The growth rate of capital is 7.3% over 
1978-1999, and 12.1% over 1999-2008, which results in a large in the increase of contribution of 
physical capital to growth, from 36.4% to 67.6%.  
The reasons for the large increase in capital’s role in growth are the combine effects of a 
higher growth rate for capital and an increased share of capital in output in recent decades (see 
Figure 4). Because the growth of labor and the share of labor in output were both decreasing, the 
contribution of labor is less, only 4% in recent decades. TFP growth decreases from 5.1% to 22 
 
2.8%, which is reflected in a sharp decrease of TFP contribution to growth from 52.9% to 28.4%. 
Therefore, if TFP growth is interpreted as technological change, Solow based growth accounting 
results indicate that the growth of technology advances slows in recent decades. This result is 
consistent with literature which emphasizes the role of physical capital input and TFP. However, 
this result underestimates the role of quality improvement in labor or human capital. 
Table 2 
Sources of China’s Economic Growth Using Simple Solow Growth Accounting 
 1978-2008 1978-1999 1999-2008 
Growth rate (% per year)     
Output  9.82% 9.72%  10.06% 
Physical capital stock  8.72% 7.30%  12.10% 
Labor  1.69% 2.03% 0.91% 
TFP  4.57% 5.14% 2.86% 
     
 Contribution to GDP growth (%)    
Physical capital stock  44.96% 36.35% 67.62% 
Labor  8.50% 10.78% 3.97% 
TFP  46.54% 52.87% 28.41% 
 
 
5.2  Sources of Growth with Human Capital in the Sense of Barro and Lee (1993; 2000) 
Next we take human capital into account in our growth accounting approach using Barro 
and Lee’s approach. We use years of schooling as a proxy for human capital which is estimated 23 
 
combining the approaches in Barro and Lee (1993; 2000) and Gemmell (1996). Table 3 indicates 
that human capital contributes 11.7% to economic growth over the entire period 1978-2008, and 
that it contributes 9.6% in the most recent decade and contributes 15% before 1999. This result  
Table 3 
 








Growth rate (% per year)     
Output   9.82% 9.72% 10.06% 
Physical capital stock  8.72% 7.30% 12.10% 
Labor  1.69% 2.03% 0.91% 
Human capital stock
* 2.34% 2.81% 2.21% 
TFP  3.45% 3.64% 2.45% 
 
Contribution to GDP growth (%) 
Physical capital stock  44.96% 36.35% 67.62% 
Labor  8.50% 10.78% 3.97% 
Human capital stock
* 11.74% 14.95% 9.60% 
TFP  34.80% 37.93% 18.81% 
       *average years of schooling as the proxy for human capital stock 
reflects a declining and only small contribution to growth from human capital formation and 
seems counterintuitive, since educational participation in China in recent decades is rising and 24 
 
substantively higher in recent years. One reason for this result is that years of schooling treats the 
productivity of different levels of education the same over time and as such undervalues the role 
of human capital. The contribution to growth of TFP declines comparing with the simple Solow 
case. 
 
5.3  Sources of Growth with Human Capital in the Sense of Schultz (1960) 
Average years of schooling is not a reliable proxy for human capital in implementing of 
growth accounting for China since it takes the productivity for different levels of education as 
the same through time, even though growth is occurring and wage rates are rising.  Using years 
of schooling alone as a proxy for human capital thus underestimates the role of human capital in 
growth accounting and for China, and given her high growth rates the effect is large. Schultz’s 
(1960) opportunity cost measure of education of inputs to human capital formation takes 
productivity into account, and seemingly provides a more appealing proxy for human capital 
formation.  
Table 4 shows the results of growth accounting which uses a proxy for human capital in 
the sense of Schultz (1960). Under this approach, human capital in China grew at 7.6% annually 
over 1978-2008; slightly less than the growth rate of physical capital. The contribution of human 
capital to growth is 38.1%, which is large although still smaller than the contribution of physical 
capital, 44.96%. TFP growth is 1.66% annually, and contributes the remaining 16.9% of 
economic growth.  The growth of human capital increases from 6.96% during 1978-1999 to 9.1% 
during 1999-2008. The contribution of human capital increases from 37% to 39.7% and TFP 
growth rate decreases from 2.59% to -0.52%. It contributes 26.65% of growth over 1978-1999 
and -7.03% over 1999-2008.  25 
 
Table 4 
Source of China’s Economic Growth, Including Human Capital in the Sense of Schultz 
 1978-2008  1978-1999  1999-2008 
Growth rate (% per year)     
Output  9.82% 9.72% 10.06% 
Physical capital stock  8.72% 7.30% 12.10% 
Human capital stock  7.59% 6.96% 9.06% 
TFP  1.66% 2.59% -0.52% 
     
Contribution to GDP growth (%) 
Physical capital stock  44.96% 36.35% 67.62% 
Human capital stock  38.12% 37.00% 39.41% 
TFP  16.92% 26.65% -7.03% 
 
We can also calculate the contributions of different inputs for the sub-period 2003-2008, 
when new graduates enter the job market after graduation. For this sub-period, economic growth 
is 10.95% annually, and the annual growth rates of human capital and physical capital are 10.7% 
and 13.2%, separately. The growth rate of human capital increases rapidly, but still lags behind 
the growth rate of physical capital. The contributions of human capital and physical capital are 





5.4  Summary and Further Interpretation 
The last set of growth accounting results above indicate that human capital plays an 
important role in China’s growth, and contributes 20%-40% to growth. Without improvement of 
labor quality and accumulation of human capital, China’s economic growth rate would be lower. 
There are several channels through which human capital contributes to economic growth. One is 
as an input like physical capital since more human capital inputs increase output. In this sense, it 
is effectively a quantitative increment to labor. Another channel may be human capital as an 
improvement to productivity. New growth theory indicates that the accumulation of human 
capital can increase the production of new ideas and innovation so that technology levels will 
improve, and increase productivity. Under this view, human capital is more than an input, and it 
should be thought as other input enhancing. The more human capital is accumulated, the more 
the chance of technology improvement and innovation, the higher the productivity of production, 
and more output results from the same inputs. In this sense, human capital is a source of 
productivity improvement. The reason why the contribution of TFP becomes negative when we 
include human capital in our growth accounting may be this. 
Our growth accounting results also suggest that China’s economic growth still relies 
heavily on capital input growth, although human capital play a more and more important role in 
economic growth over time. Despite this, the contribution of human capital still lags physical 
capital. The reasons why physical capital contributes so much to growth are a reflection in the 
share of physical capital and growth rate of physical capital. Figure 4 shows that the share of 
physical capital in GDP continues to increase, and exceeds 60% of GDP in recent years. The 




Growth Accounting Where the Share of Capital is 0.4 and the Share of 
Human Capital is 0.6 
 1978-2008 1978-1999 1999-2008  2003-2008
Growth rate (% per year)        
Output   9.82% 9.72% 10.06% 10.95%
Physical capital stock  8.72% 7.30% 12.10% 13.15%
Human capital stock  7.59% 6.96% 9.06% 10.71%
TFP  1.78% 2.62% -0.21% -0.73%
        
 Contribution to GDP growth (%) 
Physical capital stock  35.51% 30.07% 48.10% 48.03%
Human capital stock  46.34% 42.98% 54.03% 58.65%
TFP  18.15% 26.95% -2.13% -6.68%
 
GDP is underestimated in China. Gollin (2002) adjusts for self-employment and the sectoral 
composition of output, and found that the labor shares for most developing countries are in the 
range of 0.65-0.80. 
If we adjust our growth accounting analysis for this effect, the contribution of physical 
capital is smaller and contribution of human capital larger. We cannot easily separate all these 
effects, but we can perform sensitivity analysis. Table 5 reports calculation that assumes the 
share of capital in GDP is 40%. Under this treatment the contribution of physical capital in 
growth decreases to 35.5% over 1978-2008, and the contribution of human capital increases to 28 
 
46.3%, and the contributions of physical capital and human capital are 30.1% and 43% 
respectively over the period 1978-1999. For the most recent decade, the contribution of physical 
capital is 48.1%, and the contribution of human capital is 54%. For the period 2003-2008, after 
the increased educational participation, the contribution of human capital is even higher, 58.7%, 
which is a larger increase than earlier. Thus, under these assumptions, the contribution of human 






This paper reexamines the sources of China’s economic growth, emphasizing the role of 
human capital. We first evaluate the sources of growth in the sense of Solow (1957), and find 
under this analysis China’s economic growth is mainly driven by capital accumulation and TFP 
growth, which is consistent with the results in other Chinese growth accounting literature. Since 
Solow’s framework does not consider quality improvements of labor and human capital, we first 
reevaluate the sources of growth taking human capital in the sense of Barro and Lee (1993; 2000) 
into account. The contribution of human capital in the sense of Barro and Lee is minor, only 11.7% 
between 1978 and 2008. Barro and Lee’s measure of human capital is average years of schooling 
which does not distinguish productivity differences among different levels of education nor take 
wage rate changes into account over time. 
We then construct an alternative human capital measure in the sense of Schultz (1960) 
taking productivity differences into account. Using this human capital measure, we find that 
human capital plays a much more important role in China’s economic growth. The contribution 
of human capital to growth is 38%, and even higher for the most recent decade. If we allow for 
adjustment for self-employment and sectoral composition of outputs as Gollin (2002) suggests, 
the contribution of human capital is higher. Under an assumption that the share of capital in 
China in GDP is only 0.4 shows that the contribution of human capital to growth is 43% during 
1978-1999, and accounts for 54% during 1999-2008.  Human capital contributes 59% of growth 
over 2003-2008 when graduates enrolled during China’s educational transformation enter job 
markets.  In addition, since human capital growth accelerated following the major educational 
expansion after 1999 (college enrolment in China increase fivefold between 1997 and 2007), 
while growth rates of GDP are little changed, total factor productivity decreases. TFP, by our 30 
 
calculations, contributes 16.9 of growth between 1978 and 2008, but this contribution is -7% 
between 1999 and 2008 taking human capital into account in the way we suggest.  
These results suggest that economic growth in China may still be driven by growth in 
both capital inputs (physical and human), but TFP growth may have been negative in recent 
decades. Negative TFP growth along with a high contribution of physical and human capital to 
economic growth seems to suggest that there has been a decrease in the efficiency of input usage 
in China and misallocation of physical and human capital. This view is consistent with increased 
education expansion and has been accompanied by increased urban young skilled worker 
unemployment. These findings suggest that there are substantial returns to raising employment 
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